9:37 AM Lok Radio
According to Ocean mythology by looking at the structure of body and face luck, feature and details related to life can be predicted. In Shiva mythology Kumnar Kartikaya have said some features of a person which represent a person as lucky.Beautiful-Girl-Images Symptoms of woman who are lucky have also been mentioned in the mythology. It has also been mentioned in the mythology that a man who married a woman with such features will be a king. 1. According to mythology those girls whose face match with their father’s are lucky. The mythology also claims that those girl will lead a happy life and will get what they want. Similarly, men whose face match with their mother’s are also lucky. 2. Mythology also says that girls who have black hair and those whose front hair is faced forward are lucky. Girls with silky, soft hair are said to be good. 3. Girls with round and glowing face are also lucky. 4. It is believed that girls whose front part of the head is raised will be rich and sumptuous. 5. Girls whose hair partition are straight and raised are also considered as lucky. 6. Mythology describes girls with uni brow as very beautiful. And if the eye brows are arched they are considered to be very lucky. 7. Girls who have redness at the corner of their eyes, with deep black pupils and a white eye are filled with beautiful features. 8. Girls whose elbow joint is not seen are also considered to be very lucky. 9. Girls who have long and hairless hands are kept on the highest spot. Girls with short hands are considered as rare. 10. Girls with shiny, round and raised nails are considered to be very lucky. 11. According to mythology girls with reddish, soft and shiny foot sole are said to be very lucky. 12. Mythology also says that girls with extra long fingers should not be trusted easily. It is not considered good to get married to these types of women.
9:17 AM Lok Radio
ISIS jihadi with American accent addresses Obama in ’revenge’ video for US special forces raid which rescued 70 Iraqi hostages as four Peshmerga fighters are beheadedWARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT
ISIS beheaded four
Peshmerga fighters in latest sickening execution video
Three are forced to watch as another is killed - then they are murdered too
Masked militant with American accent says video is ’revenge’ for a US raid
Special forces freed 70 Iraqis from an ISIS jail and killed 20 terrorists
Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, 39, was killed in the daring mission
ISIS militants have beheaded four Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in ’revenge’ for a raid by US special forces that rescued 70 Iraqi hostages and killed 20 terrorists.
In the barbaric group’s latest execution video, a masked English-speaking man with an American accent is seen clutching a knife as he stands over one of the hostages.
Three other jihadis - all dressed in black with their faces covered - are also seen holding blades as they stand behind three other Kurds wearing orange jumpsuits.
Addressing President Obama, the lead executioner says the beheadings are
’revenge’ for the raid on an ISIS jail.
9:07 AM Lok Radio
PART 5 Good faith and contracting out Good faith 14Good faith (1)Any rule of law permitting a party to a contract of insurance to avoid the contract on the ground that the utmost good faith has not been observed by the other party is abolished. (2)Any rule of law to the effect that a contract of insurance is a contract based on the utmost good faith is modified to the extent required by the provisions of this Act and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. (3)Accordingly— (a)in section 17 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (marine insurance contracts are contracts of the utmost good faith), the words from “, and” to the end are omitted, and (b)the application of that section (as so amended) is subject to the provisions of this Act and the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012. (4)In section 2 of the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 (disclosure and representations before contract or variation), subsection (5) is omitted. Contracting out 15Contracting out: consumer insurance contracts (1)A term of a consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the consumer in a worse position as respects any of the matters provided for in Part 3 or 4 of this Act than the consumer would be in by virtue of the provisions of those Parts (so far as relating to consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent of no effect. (2)In subsection (1) references to a contract include a variation. (3)This section does not apply in relation to a contract for the settlement of a claim arising under a consumer insurance contract. 16Contracting out: non-consumer insurance contracts (1)A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the insured in a worse position as respects representations to which section 9 applies than the insured would be in by virtue of that section is to that extent of no effect. (2)A term of a non-consumer insurance contract, or of any other contract, which would put the insured in a worse position as respects any of the other matters provided for in Part 2, 3 or 4 of this Act than the insured would be in by virtue of the provisions of those Parts (so far as relating to non-consumer insurance contracts) is to that extent of no effect, unless the requirements of section 17 have been satisfied in relation to the term. (3)In this section references to a contract include a variation. (4)This section does not apply in relation to a contract for the settlement of a claim arising under a non-consumer insurance contract. 17The transparency requirements (1)In this section, “the disadvantageous term” means such a term as is mentioned in section 16(2). (2)The insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the insured’s attention before the contract is entered into or the variation agreed. (3)The disadvantageous term must be clear and unambiguous as to its effect. (4)In determining whether the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) have been met, the characteristics of insured persons of the kind in question, and the circumstances of the transaction, are to be taken into account. (5)The insured may not rely on any failure on the part of the insurer to meet the requirements of subsection (2) if the insured (or its agent) had actual knowledge of the disadvantageous term when the contract was entered into or the variation agreed. 18Contracting out: group insurance contracts (1)This section applies to a contract of insurance referred to in section 13(1)(a); and in this section— “A” and “the Cs” have the same meaning as in section 13, “consumer C” means an individual who is one of the Cs, where the cover provided by the contract for that individual would have been a consumer insurance contract if entered into by that person rather than by A, and “non-consumer C” means any of the Cs who is not a consumer C. (2)A term of the contract of insurance, or any other contract, which puts a consumer C in a worse position as respects any matter dealt with in section 13 than that individual would be in by virtue of that section is to that extent of no effect. (3)A term of the contract of insurance, or any other contract, which puts a non-consumer C in a worse position as respects any matter dealt with in section 13 than that person would be in by virtue of that section is to that extent of no effect, unless the requirements of section 17 have been met in relation to the term. (4)Section 17 applies in relation to such a term as it applies to a term mentioned in section 16(2), with references to the insured being read as references to A rather than the non-consumer C. (5)In this section references to a contract include a variation. (6)This section does not apply in relation to a contract for the settlement of a claim arising under a contract of insurance to which this section applies.
9:07 AM Lok Radio
Amendment of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 19Power to change meaning of “relevant person” for purposes of 2010 Act For section 19 of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (power to amend sections 4 to 6 of the Act) substitute— “19Power to change the meaning of “relevant person” (1)The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision adding or removing circumstances in which a person is a “relevant person” for the purposes of this Act, subject to subsection (2). (2)Regulations under this section may add circumstances only if, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, the additional circumstances— (a)involve actual or anticipated dissolution of a body corporate or an unincorporated body, (b)involve actual or anticipated insolvency or other financial difficulties for an individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body, or (c)are similar to circumstances for the time being described in sections 4 to 7. (3)Regulations under this section may make provision about— (a)the persons to whom, and the extent to which, rights are transferred under section 1 in the circumstances added or removed by the regulations (the “affected circumstances”), (b)the re-transfer of rights transferred under section 1 where the affected circumstances change, and (c)the effect of a transfer of rights under section 1 on the liability of the insured in the affected circumstances. (4)Regulations under this section which add or remove circumstances involving actual or anticipated dissolution of a body corporate or unincorporated body may change the cases in which the following provisions apply so that they include or exclude cases involving that type of dissolution or any other type of dissolution of a body— (a)section 9(3) (cases in which transferred rights are not subject to a condition requiring the insured to provide information or assistance to the insurer), and (b)paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 (notices requiring disclosure). (5)Regulations under this section which add circumstances may provide that section 1 of this Act applies in cases involving those circumstances in which either or both of the following occurred in relation to a person before the day on which the regulations come into force— (a)the circumstances arose in relation to the person; (b)a liability against which the person was insured under an insurance contract was incurred. (6)Regulations under this section which— (a)add circumstances, and (b)provide that section 1 of this Act applies in a case involving those circumstances in which both of the events mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and (b) occurred in relation to a person before the day on which the regulations come into force, must provide that, in such a case, the person is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as not having become a relevant person until that day or a later day specified in the regulations. (7)Regulations under this section which remove circumstances may provide that section 1 of this Act does not apply in cases involving those circumstances in which one of the events mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and (b) (but not both) occurred in relation to a person before the day on which the regulations come into force. (8)Regulations under this section may— (a)include consequential, incidental, supplementary, transitional, transitory or saving provision, (b)make different provision for different purposes, and (c)make provision by reference to an enactment as amended, extended or applied from time to time, (and subsections (3) to (7) are without prejudice to the generality of this subsection). (9)Regulations under this section may amend an enactment, whenever passed or made, including this Act. (10)Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument. (11)Regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.” 20Other amendments Schedule 2 amends the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 in relation to the insured persons to whom the Act applies.
9:06 AM Lok Radio
THE INSURANCE ACT 2015 Summary This article summarises the reforms to the UK’s Insurance Law regime that will be introduced by the Insurance Act 2015. The forthcoming changes are significant and may affect anyone involved in the insurance market in any capacity, whether as insurer, broker or as an insured. British insurance law largely developed in the 18th and 19th centuries and the most significant piece of legislation, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (“MIA”), is now more than 100 years old. In the last 109 years, international commerce and the insurance market have changed significantly and the UK insurance market is the third largest market in the world. In 2006 the Law Commission were asked to consider the existing insurance law regime in the UK to consider whether it was still fit for purpose in the modern insurance market. The Commission’s conclusion was that the current law is outdated and out of step with the realities of 21st century commercial practice. As a result, the Law Commission published The Insurance Bill 2014 which was first put before Parliament in July 2014. The Bill received Royal Assent on 12th February 2015 to become the Insurance Act 2015 (the “Act”) but the vast majority of its provisions will only enter into force on 12th August 2016 to allow the market time to adjust its practices. The Act seeks to extend reforms made in 2009 to consumer contracts of insurance: The Act makes wide ranging reforms to the law relating to non-consumer insurance contracts which, inter alia, will make it harder for insurers to avoid claims as a result of technical breaches by the insured. THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE ACT The Act is designed to update the statutory framework in line with best practice in the modern UK insurance market. The Act will make 6 main changes to the current law: 1. The Duty of Fair Presentation As things stand, as part of its overall duty of utmost good faith to the insurer, an insured’s duty is to provide all information that would be material to the risk, whether or not the insurer requests that information. S.18(3) MIA provides the exceptions to this rule are circumstances which diminish the risk, circumstances which are known or presumed to be known to the insurer, circumstances as to which information has been waived by the insurer and circumstances which are superfluous to disclose due to a warranty. The onus as regards disclosure is therefore currently entirely on the insured. Should the duty be breached, the insurer is entitled to avoid the policy entirely. The law as set out in the MIA does not currently provide for an intermediate remedy. Over the years English courts developed partial solutions to this apparent injustice in appropriate cases by placing conditions upon the rigour of the duty of disclosure. Briefly the misrepresentation or non-disclosure complained of must relate to a material fact which ought to have been disclosed accurately and which induced the insurer to enter into the contract of insurance on the terms agreed. However the MIA remained unaltered which could easily lead to confusion. Sections 21(2) of the Act effectively repeals sections 18, 19 and 20 of the MIA which deal with disclosure by the assured or his agent and pre-contract representations. Section 3 of the Act seeks to clarify the current law and modify the duty of utmost good faith that underlies insurance contracts by introducing the new duty of “fair presentation”. This requires policyholders to either (i) disclose to insurers “every material circumstance” which the insured knows or ought to know; or (ii) provide the insurer with “sufficient information” to put a prudent insurer on notice that it needs to make further enquiries into those “material circumstances”. In addition to matters that the insured actually knows, the insured only “ought to know” matters that a reasonable search of the information available to it should have reasonably revealed. Brokers may wish to take a more active role in directing the insured’s search to ensure compliance with this requirement. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of The Act set out detailed provisions explaining what exactly is meant by “knowledge” of material circumstances, who must know the information concerned and what the Act means by the word “know”. A detailed analysis of these sections is outside the scope of this article but it will be a fertile field for disputes so far as the “knowledge” of companies is concerned. The duty of fair presentation under the Act retains the current position that unless specific enquiries are made by the insurer, an insured need not disclose to the insurer circumstances which would diminish the insurer’s risk or which the insurer knows or ought to know, is presumed to know or has waived information about. This is likely to mean that, unless the policy expressly provides otherwise or if the lead underwriter has changed, an insured is not required to disclose claims made in a previous policy year under the same insurance policy because the insurer would already be taken to be aware of those claims. These changes mark a shift in English insurance law and will justify insurers taking an active approach to assessing the risks they underwrite rather than a passive stance in relying on the insured and its broker to provide all relevant information. In order to ensure that it is told about all material circumstances it may be advisable for the insurer to outline to the insured the particular or potential risks it is concerned about thus put the insured on notice what the insurer considers is material to the relevant risk. 2. New remedies for Non-Disclosure Perhaps most important is the change in the remedies for failure to comply with the duty of pre-contract disclosure (known as the duty of fair presentation in the Act). The position as stated in the MIA flows from sections 18 and 19 which are to be repealed by the Act. At present an insurer is entitled to avoid the entire contract in the event that there is a failure by the insured to disclose all material information. The undisclosed information need not relate to the loss. All that is currently required to enable the insurer to avoid is that the undisclosed information was unknown to the insurer and material. Section 7 of the Act retains the old definition of materiality so that a circumstance or representation is material if it would influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in determining whether to take the risk and, if so, on what terms. Under the Act however, an insurer will only be entitled to avoid the policy entirely (unless fraud can be proved – see below) where the breach of the duty of fair presentation is “deliberate or reckless” and where the insurer can show that he would not have entered into the contract had he known the information or would only have done so on different terms. The requirement that the insured’s failure to disclose information was “deliberate or reckless” could be very difficult for insurers to prove.1 Where the breach is neither reckless nor deliberate the remedies set out in the Act are less draconian. They are intended to be proportionate and to reflect what the insurer would have done if he had known the undisclosed information before entering into the contract. If the insurer is unable to show a deliberate or reckless breach, it may only refuse the claim in its entirety and avoid the policy if it can show that he would not have written the policy at all. However, if he would have only written the policy on different terms and/or taken a higher premium then the contract is treated as entered into on those terms or the claim is reduced proportionately in line with the higher premium. It is to be expected that expert evidence from underwriting experts will be of far greater significance in disputes arising under the Act’s provisions. The Courts will further need to develop and give meaning to the question of what a deliberate or reckless breach entails. 3. Warranties and other terms The current position as stated in the MIA is that a breach of a warranty in an insurance contract entitles the insurer to avoid all claims under the policy from the date of breach. This is the case even where the breach was immaterial and unrelated to the loss and did not induce the insurer to enter the insurance contract. Provided the breach is not waived by the insurer, the insurer is discharged even if the breach is later remedied.2 Under sections 9 to 11 of the Act the effect of a breach of warranty will be less severe. Any warranty breach by an insured now merely suspends (rather than entirely discharges) the insurer’s liability until the breach is remedied. The insurer will have no liability for any claim arising if the policy is suspended but once the breach has been remedied then the policy resumes in full force. The Act also prevents an insurer avoiding an insurance contract if a warranty ceases to be applicable to the circumstances of the contract due to a change of circumstances or if it is rendered unlawful (e.g. by sanctions) or is waived by the insurer. The Act also abolishes “basis of the contract”3 clauses in non-consumer contracts. Such clauses currently have the effect of converting all pre-contractual representations in a proposal form into warranties sometimes using wording that is not necessarily clear to the insured. This then means that the insurer can be discharged from liability if the proposal form contains any statement that is inaccurate even where that misrepresentation is immaterial to the loss and in no way induces the insurer to enter the contract. These so called “basis of the contract” clauses or any other attempt to give pre-contractual representations the status of a warranty by way of a provision in the insurance contract will not be valid when the Act comes into force. It will not be possible to contract out of this prohibition. Section 11(1) of the Act will also apply to conditions precedent and exclusion clauses provided they relate to a particular type of loss or a loss at a particular location or time. Other types of conditions precedent and exclusion clauses appear to be unaffected. A further, potentially very significant, amendment to the existing law under the Act arises from the Law Commission’s proposal that insurers should not be entitled to avoid a claim where the insured’s breach did not relate to the loss. Section 11 of the Act provides that if an insured does not comply with a warranty or other term which relates to a particular type of loss, or the risk of loss at a particular location or time, the insurer may not rely on non-compliance with that contractual term by the insured if the insured is able to show that non-compliance with the term could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred. This seems complicated but essentially introduces a type of causation requirement into insurance contracts to ensure that a breach of a term of an insurance contract must be related to the particular loss in question. A direct causal link between the breach of the term or warranty and the loss is however not required. The joint submission of the LMA and IUA illustrates this with an example in which a household policy contains a clause warranting that all outside doors should be locked by five bolt locks at night. Thieves break down the locked door, which is found to have only a three bolt lock, and rob the house. In such circumstances the assured can argue that the thieves were so well equipped/armed that whatever precautions had been taken by way of locks they would still have got in: in other words that the risk of loss would not have been affected by failure to have a five bolt rather than a three bolt lock. Section 11 of the Act does not apply to terms which “define the risk as a whole”. The introduction of such a requirement is entirely new to English insurance law and could introduce considerable uncertainty over the application of warranties and other terms to a particular loss, which will need to be clarified and defined by the Courts. Furthermore the introduction of a causation requirement could open the door to extensive expert evidence to answer the questions of whether compliance with a certain warranty or term would have a tendency to reduce risk and whether non-compliance with that warranty or term could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred. 4. Fraudulent claims Section 12 of the Act provides that if the insured makes a fraudulent claim the insurer is not liable to pay the claim. If such a claim is presented the insurer may recover sums paid in respect of the loss and the insurer may give notice terminating the insurance as from the date of the fraudulent act and need not return the premium. Claims arising from an event before the fraud would however continue to be payable. This reflects the law as it currently stands as established by the Courts. In this area the Act does not change the law but merely codifies it. 5. Contracting Out and the Transparency Requirements In respect of consumer contracts, an insurer cannot agree terms which put the insured in a worse position than that set out in the Act. In April 2013 the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 came into effect. This Act abolished the traditional rules of non-disclosure and misrepresentation in consumer contracts and instead introduced a duty of reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation. The Act is therefore mainly significant for non-consumer insurance contracts. In respect of non-consumer contracts, parties will be entitled to agree terms which are less favourable to the insured than those set out in the Act4 subject, however, to certain transparency requirements which require; (i) the insurer to take “sufficient steps” to draw “disadvantageous terms” to the insured’s attention; (ii) the “disadvantageous term” must further be “clear and unambiguous”. It will therefore not be possible for insurers to avoid the Act by introducing a simple additional clause into their policy documentation excluding the application of the Act without bringing the Act to the insured’s attention. Depending on the characteristics and sophistication of the insured in question and the circumstances of the transaction it may further be necessary for the insurer to spell out expressly the default position under the Act and any disadvantageous deviations from it. It will be interesting to see whether, after the Act becomes law, the London market embraces the changes proposed in the Act or whether insurers, brokers and insurers will agree standard carve out provisions for use in standard terms with the aim of avoiding or minimising its effect. 6. The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 To date, the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 which is intended to enable victims of wrongdoers to proceed directly against the insurer, has not come into force due to a number of technical deficiencies. The Act rectifies the deficiencies and should allow the 2010 Act to come into force in the near future. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS – The Act, when its important provisions become law on 12th August 2016, will make a number of far reaching and very significant changes to the existing insurance law regime. It will shift some of the responsibility of disclosure from the insured by imposing a duty of enquiry on the insurer and limiting the insured’s duty of disclosure. It introduces proportionate remedies for non-disclosure. It allows the insured to remedy a breach of warranty, merely suspending the policy while it is being breached. In some cases the Act may allow the insured to disable an insurer’s defence of breach of warranty or other term by showing that the breach of the warranty or term could not have increased the risk of the loss in question occurring. – Although the Act will allow the parties to contract out of most of these new rules, any opt-out will be subject to compliance with transparency requirements and may therefore be open to attack. – As with any new legislation, there will be initial uncertainty over the interpretation of new concepts and the changes introduced. However, even over the longer term, it can be expected that the envisaged changes and the proportionate approach of the Act will allow the parties greater scope to argue over hypotheticals (such as the questions of what higher premiums an insurer would have charged or whether compliance with a certain warranty would not have increased the risk). This is likely to increase litigants’ reliance on expert evidence and may introduce uncertainty in the market. – At the underwriting stage, it can be expected that the changes will encourage both the insurer and the insured to ask more questions of each other, which may in turn increase the role and responsibility of brokers. – When the Act comes into force, insurers should have a very careful look at their standard terms to ensure they comply with transparency requirements. – The Insured and/or their brokers may wish to develop criteria for carrying out reasonable searches and seek increased input from the insurers during the underwriting stage. 1 As Lord Mance said in giving evidence to The House of Lords Special Public Bill Committee in December 2014: “It is, after all, the insured who knows the facts and knows his own state of mind and it strikes me that this is the wrong way round……It seems to me that one would expect the onus to be placed on the insured, who has the relevant knowledge about his, her or its state of mind”. 2 It should be noted that the Courts have endeavoured to soften the effect of this strict position by a number of mechanisms with the result that only if the term is clearly worded as a warranty and its breach was instrumental in causing the loss claimed can there be any real confidence that its full effect will be upheld in the Courts. For instance in Pratt v Aigaion  the term: “Warranted Owner and/or Owner’s experienced skipper on board and in charge at all times and one experienced crew member” was held to mean that the insured fishing vessel had to be fully crewed while at sea but not when it was in port (when the loss occurred). Further problems have been encountered in reinsurance cases as a result of the doctrine of the strict enforcement of warranties in English law. In the law of the majority of countries warranties entitle the insurer to avoid the contract of insurance if the breach of the warranty was causative of the loss. This was the case in both Vesta v Butcher  and Groupama v Catatumbo  where the law respectively of Norway and Venezuela applied to the underlying policies but the reinsurances were subject to English law. In both cases the English Courts, construed the reinsurance contract back-to back with the underlying policy and refused to enforce the warranties. However in Wasa v Lexington  the House of Lords, in similar circumstances, did enforce the warranty and held the reinsurers were not liable on this (among several other grounds). This uncertainty would arise far less often if English law was brought into line with most other countries. 3 Sometimes found in proposal forms which request the Insured to provide factual information about the risk the clause will state that the information provided will form the “basis of the contract” of insurance so that if any false statements appear on the form (whether deliberate or not) the insurer may avoid the policy. Such clauses are enforced as warranties and one was upheld as recently as October 2013 by the Court of Appeal in Genesis Housing Association Ltd v Liberty Syndicate Management Limited . 4 Subject to the exception that “basis of contract clauses” will be invalid regardless.